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Florin Constantin∗ Jon Feldman† S. Muthukrishnan† Martin Pál†
ABSTRACT
Many advertisers use Internet systems to buy advertise-
ments on publishers’ webpages or on traditional media such
as radio, TV and newsprint. They seek a simple, online
mechanism to reserve ad slots in advance. On the other
hand, media publishers represent a vast and varying inven-
tory, and they too seek automatic, online mechanisms for
pricing and allocating such reservations.
In this paper, we present and study a simple model for
auctioning such ad slots in advance. Bidders arrive sequen-
tially and report which slots they are interested in. The
seller must decide immediately whether or not to grant a
reservation. Our model allows a seller to accept reserva-
tions, but possibly cancel the allocations later and pay the
bidder a cancellation compensation (bump payment).
Our main result is an online mechanism to derive prices
and bump payments that is efficient to implement. This
mechanism has many desirable properties. It is individually
rational; winners have an incentive to be honest and bidding
one’s true value dominates any lower bid. Our mechanism’s
efficiency is within a constant fraction of the a posteriori
optimally efficient solution. Its revenue is within a constant
fraction of the a posteriori VCG revenue. Our results make
no assumptions about the order of arrival of bids or the value
distribution of bidders. All our results still hold if the items
for sale are elements of a matroid, a more general setting
than slot allocation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Many advertisers now use Internet advertising systems.
These take the form of advertisement (ad, henceforth) place-
ments either in response to users’ web search queries, or
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at predetermined slots on publishers’ web pages. In ad-
dition, increasingly, advertisers use Internet systems that
sell ad slots on behalf of offline publishers on TV, radio or
newsprint. In sponsored search, and in some other cases, ad
slots are typically sold via real time auctions, i.e., when a
user poses a query or visits a web page, an auction is used
to determine which ads will show and where they will be
placed. On the other hand, traditionally, advertisers seek ad
slots in advance, i.e. to reserve their slots. Product releases
(such as movies, electronic gadgets, etc) and ad campaigns
(e.g., creating and testing ads, budgets) are planned ahead
of time and need to coordinate with future events that target
suitable demographics. The advertisers then do not want to
risk the vagrancies of real-time auctions and lose ad slots at
critical events; they typically like a reasonable guarantee of
ad slots at a specific time in the future within their budget
constraints today.
Our motivation arises from systems that enable such ad-
vanced ad slotting. In particular, our focus is on automatic
systems that have to manage ad slots in many different pub-
lishers’ properties. These properties differ wildly in their
traffic, targeting, price and effectiveness; consider placement
in the front page of nytimes.com versus placement in an in-
dividual’s blog versus a radio slot in a local country music
radio station. Also, the inventory levels are massive. Slots
and impressions in web publishers’ properties as well ad slots
in TV, radio, newsprint and other traditional media are in
100’s of millions and more. Not all publishers can estimate
their inventory accurately: traffic to websites responds to
time-dependent events, and sometimes webpages are gener-
ated dynamically so that even the availability of a slot in the
future is not known a priori. Most web publishers are not
able to estimate accurately a price for an ad slot, or provide
sales agents to negotiate terms and would like automatic
methods to price ad slots. Thus, what is desirable is a sim-
ple, automatic, online1 market-based mechanism to enable
advanced ad slotting over such varied, massive inventory.
Inspired by these considerations, we study the problem of
mechanism design for advanced ad slotting. The problem
is quite general with many facets. Our contribution is to
propose a simple model, to design a suitable mechanism and
to analyze its properties. In more detail, our contributions
are as follows.
(i) We propose the following simple high-level model for
advanced ad slotting auctions. An auction starts at time 0;
1We use the word online as in online algorithm—i.e., the
input arrives over time, and the algorithm makes sequential
decisions —we do not mean “on the Internet.”
the seller has a set of slots for sale that will be published at
time T . Bidder i arrives at some time ai < T , reports which
slots he is interested in, places a bid w(i) and requests an
immediate response. Bidder i is either accepted or rejected;
if accepted, he may be removed (bumped) later, but in that
case, he is awarded a bump payment. We assume that if
bumped, a bidder incurs a loss of an α fraction of its value.
At time T , each accepted bidder that has not been bumped
is published in one of the slots he was interested in, and pays
a price that is at most his bid.
This model lets the publisher accept a reservation at time
t for a slot available at a later time T , and lets the advertiser
get a reasonable guarantee. However, crucially, it lets the
publisher cancel the reservation at a later time. Cancellation
is necessary for publishers to take advantage of a spike in de-
mand and rising prices for an item and not be forced to sell
the slot below the market because of an a priori contract.
In addition, in a pragmatic sense, cancellation is crucial: for
example, a website might overestimate its inventory for a
later date and accept ads, but as time progresses, its esti-
mates may become smaller, and the publisher will not be
able to honor all the accepted ads from the past. Finally,
cancellations are very much part of the business with ad-
vance bookings, both within advertising and beyond. At
the same time, it comes at a cost, which is the bump pay-
ment. This is reasonable since it compensates the advertiser
for the uncertainty, and lets advertisers recoup part of their
costs involved in preparing a campaign for time T based on
their reservation at time t. We present our model formally
in Section 3.
(ii)We present an efficiently implementable mechanism Mα(γ)
for determining who is accepted, who is bumped and also the
prices and bump payments. The parameter γ represents how
much higher a new bid has to be in order to bump an older
bid. A bumped bidder will be paid an α fraction of their
bid, making up for their utility loss due to being bumped.
(iii) We show a number of important strategic as well as
efficiency- and revenue-related properties of Mα(γ):
• Mα(γ) is individually rational and winners have an in-
centive to bid truthfully while losers should bid at least
their true value.
• With respect to the bids received, the efficiency (value
of assignment) of Mα(γ) is at least a constant factor
(depending on γ and α) of the offline optimum. Under
mild player rationality assumptions, we show that our
mechanism is competitive with respect to the optimum
offline efficiency on bidders’ true values.
• We also consider the notion of effective efficiency which
interprets social welfare as the sum of the winners’ bids
minus bumped (if any) bidders’ losses. We show that
for suitable γ(α), our mechanism’s effective efficiency
matches a numerically obtained upper bound on the
effective efficiency of any deterministic algorithm. To
our knowledge, costly cancellations have not been pre-
viously studied in online bipartite matching problems.
• The revenue of Mα(γ) is at least a constant factor (de-
pendent on γ and α) of that of the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism on all received bids.
• We also study speculators, that is, ones who have no
interest in the items for sale but who participate in
order to earn the bump payment. We show several
game theoretic properties about the behavior of the
speculators, including bounding their overall profit.
To the best of our knowledge our results are the first about
mechanisms with strong game-theoretic properties for ad-
vanced placement of ads (more generally, indivisible goods)
with a cancellation feature. We make no assumptions on the
arrival order of the bidders or on their values. Prior work
has studied advanced sale of goods without cancellations,
but only under a probabilistic distribution of bidders’ val-
ues [6, 8]. Under a worst case model like ours, no nontrivial
results are possible without making additional assumptions;
in our case, we overcome these impossibilities by allowing
cancellations. In secretary problems [1], bids may be arbi-
trary but their order is assumed to be uniformly random
(cannot be specified by an adversary).
There are specific examples of systems that implement
advanced booking with cancellations. For example, this is
common in the airline industry, where tickets may be booked
ahead of time, and customers may be bumped later for a
payment. In the airline case, the inventory is mostly fixed,
sophisticated models are used to calculate prices over time,
and often negotiations are involved in establishing the pay-
ment for bumping, just prior to time T . In some cases, the
bump payments may even be larger than the original bid
(price) of the customer. Likewise, in offline media such as
TV or Radio, humans are involved are in negotiating ad-
vanced prices, and often if the publisher does not respect
the reservation due to inventory crunch, a payment is a pos-
teriori arranged including possibly a better ad slot in the
future. These methods are not immediately applicable to
the auction-driven automatic settings like ours.
From a technical point of view, one can view our model as
an online weighted bipartite matching problem (or more gen-
erally, an online maximum weighted independent set prob-
lem in a matroid). On one side we have slots known ahead
of time. The other side comprises advertisers whose bids
(weighted nodes) arrive online. Our goal is to find a “good”
weighted matching in the eventual graph. Each time an ad-
vertiser appears we need to decide if we should retain it or
discard it; retaining it may lead to discarding a previously
retained bidder. Our mechanism builds on such an online
matching algorithm [9] to determine a suitable bump pay-
ment and prices. It is, curiously, able to make use of such an
online algorithm previously proposed in the semi-streaming
model in the theoretical computer science literature.
All our results extend to a setting where the items for
sale are elements of a matroid, a more general setting than
slot allocation. A bidder bids on exactly one element of
the matroid, which is known ahead of time and may vary
across bidders. A set S of bidders is then feasible if the set
containing each bidder’s element forms an independent set
of the matroid. In the bipartite matching setting, the seller’s
matroid contains one element for each subset of slots and a
set of bidders (elements) is independent if the bidders can
be matched to slots such that each one receives an element
from its subset. We prefer the matching language for clarity
of exposition.
We have initiated the study of mechanisms for advanced
reservations with cancellations. A number of technical prob-
lems remain open, both within our model, as well as in its
extensions, which we describe later for future study.
2. RELATED WORK
There is considerable work on auctions when bidders are
present throughout a period of time. Of more direct rele-
vance are the following classes of problems.
Babaioff et al. [1] address the matroid secretary problem:
finding a competitive assignment when weighted elements
of a matroid arrive online and no cancellations are allowed.
As is common in secretary problems, while not making any
assumption on bidder valuations, they assume that all or-
ders of arrivals are equally likely. They present a log r-
competitive algorithm for general matroids where r is the
rank of the matroid (the size of the largest independent sets)
and a 4d-competitive algorithm for our setting without can-
cellations (transversal matroids) but where each bidder can
only be interested in at most d items. Both these algorithms
observe half of the input and then set a threshold price: per
item in the transversal case and uniform in the general case.
The 4d-competitive algorithm ensures truthful bidding even
when the items desired by an agent are private information.
Dimitrov and Plaxton [4] extend the 4d-algorithm and pro-
vide an algorithm with a constant competitive ratio for any
transversal matroid.
Bikhchandani et al. [2] present an ascending auction for
selling elements of a matroid that ends with an optimal al-
location (i.e. the auction is efficient). Truthful bidding is
an equilibrium of the auction. They assume however that
bidders are present throughout the auction.
Cary et al. [3] show that a random sampling profit extrac-
tion mechanism approximates a VCG-based target profit in
a procurement setting on a matroid.
Gallien and Gupta [6] analyze players’ strategies regard-
ing buyout prices in online auctions. In their model, bid-
ders’ valuations are drawn from a known distribution and
their utilities are time-discounted; furthermore there are no
cancellations and arrivals are assumed to follow a Poisson
process. They exhibit symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria in
which buyers follow certain threshold strategies. Assuming
that buyers follow the corresponding equilibrium strategies,
the seller can then optimize revenue by tuning the price
function.
Lavi and Nisan [8] consider online auctions for identical
goods. In their model, bidders’ values are arbitrary from the
interval [ρ, ρ] and no cancellations are possible. They present
a simple online posted-price auction based on exponential
scaling. This auction is optimal among online auctions and
achieves a Θ(log(ρ/ρ)) approximation with respect to both
efficiency and the VCG revenue.
Independently form us, Feige et al. [5] study an offline
weighted bipartite matching problem where the seller can
partially satisfy a bidder’s request at the cost of paying a
proportional penalty. Accepting a bid but not providing any
items results in a utility loss proportional to the bid, similar
to our definition of effective efficiency in Section 5.1. They
show that it is NP-hard to approximate the optimal solu-
tion within any constant factor. They propose an adaptive
greedy algorithm assigning one bidder at a time (but that
inspects all unassigned bidders in deciding which bidder to
allocate) and that may reassign bidders. They provide a
lower bound on this algorithm’s efficiency with respect to
the optimal assignment.
3. MODEL AND MECHANISM
We first define our model and present our mechanism
which we will study in later sections.
3.1 Model Basics
There is a seller who has a finite set of slots (items), and
starts sale at time 0 and ends sale at time T .
Each bidder i is interested in exactly one slot out of a
set N(i) called i’s choice set. We denote by v(i) bidder i’s
value for any slot in N(i) and we assume that v(i) is private
information to i. Each bidder i places a bid w(i) (that may
be different than v(i)) as soon as it arrives, at time ai. As
a consequence of i bidding, i’s choice set becomes known to
the seller. When i bids, he may be accepted (i.e. promised an
item from N(i)), else rejected. If promised an allocation, he
may get bumped later, losing the reservation. Any accepted
bidder who is not bumped before time T is allocated. We
model bidder i’s utility as
λ · v(i)− x(i), where (1)
• λ equals 0 if i is rejected, 1 if i is accepted and granted
from N(i) and −α if i is accepted but bumped.
• x(i) is i’s transfer to the seller (price). It is 0 if i is
rejected, and some non-negative amount if i is accepted
and allocated. x(i) may be negative (e.g. the bump
payment the seller makes in Mα(γ)).
That is, a bidder is unaffected if rejected right away, has
a value of v(i) for being allocated, and incurs a loss amount-
ing to an α fraction of its value if bumped. The utility is
quasilinear in money.
Note that from an algorithmic perspective, our problem
is online maximum weighted bipartite matching with costly
cancellations. There is a bipartite graph with items (re-
spectively bidders) as “right”-(respectively “left”-)hand side
vertices. Left-hand side vertices are fixed. One by one, a
right-hand side vertex i is revealed together with its weight
w(i) and its edges (i.e. the set N(i)). A decision whether
to accept i or not must be taken immediately. The goal is
to find a matching of weight as high as possible, where can-
cellations are allowed, but canceling bidder i of weight w(i)
results in a penalty of αw(i).
However, in our setting bidders are self-interested and may
alter the input to the algorithm (their bids) if it is in their
interest to do so. Therefore we aim for a mechanism that
is competitive while bounding the bidders’ manipulations.
Note that if α = 0, then we can tentatively accept any bidder
and only decide at time T which bidders are truly accepted
while rejecting the remainder, thus reducing the problem to
finding a bipartite matching of maximum weight, a standard
offline optimization. By charging each bidder its VCG (see
Section 6) price, it becomes a dominant strategy for each
bidder to be truthful (i.e. bid its true value).
3.2 Our Mα(γ) Mechanism
We present our advance-booking online mechanism Mα(γ)
(allocation algorithm and payments). The allocation algo-
rithm follows the Find-Weighted-Matching algorithm in [9]2.
2Unlike [9], a bidder i’s value is the same for any slot (ver-
tices as opposed to edges are weighted). Our mechanism
may then change the slot i is currently assigned to at vari-
ous stages in the algorithm.
Apart from α, which is specified by the model, the algorithm
uses an improvement factor γ > 0 such that 0 < α < γ
1+γ
.
Denote the number of bidders by n; our mechanism is
independent of n. By relabeling bidders, assume that they
bid in order 1, 2, . . . , n; time is indexed likewise.
Definition 1. We say that a set of bidders B can be
matched if for each b ∈ B there exists an item ib ∈ N(b)
such that ib 6= ib′ , ∀ b 6= b′. We say that B is a perfect
matching if it can be matched and no item is left unmatched
(B’s cardinality must equal the number of items).
Mα(γ)’s pseudocode is listed in Algorithm 1. At a high
level, Mα(γ) maintains a set of accepted bidders that form
a perfect matching. For any new arriving bidder i bidding
w(i), the algorithm looks if there exists some bidder j in the
accepted set with w(j) < w(i)
1+γ
such that i can be swapped
in the matching if j is swapped out. If so, accept i and
cancel the reservation of (bump) j∗, the lowest weight such
j. Bidder j∗ is paid the bump payment αw(j∗). (Note that
j∗ makes no payment at all and in fact gets money for free
from the seller if bumped.) An accepted bidder who is not
bumped by time T is necessarily allocated a slot from his
choice set and pays the seller an amount we define later
(Eq.(2)).
At time 0, A0 is an arbitrary matching; we introduce r
dummy bidders (each bidding 0) whose choice set is the
whole set of items, arriving before all actual bidders. This
will not affect our arguments below.3At time t, we call cur-
rently accepted bidders alive, and denote the set of alive
bidders as At. Let Xt = {b ∈ At−1 : At−1 ∪ {t} \ {b} can be
matched}; Xt is the set of alive bidders at t− 1 that can be
exchanged for t. Bidders still alive at the end (time T ) are
called survivors and S = S(w) denotes this set. We denote
the set of bumped bidders by R = R(w).
Algorithm 1 Mα(γ).
Fix A0, an arbitrary perfect matching on dummy bidders.
for each i ≥ 1 bidding w(i) (with choice set N(i)) do
Let Xi = {j < i : Ai−1 ∪ {i} \ {j} can be matched}.
Let j∗ = argminj∈Xi w(j)
if (1 + γ)w(j∗) < w(i) then
Ai = Ai−1 ∪ {i} \ {j∗}: i is accepted, j∗ is bumped
j∗ is paid αw(j∗), i.e. an α fraction of its bid
end if
end for
Charge any bidder i in S , An (i.e. survivor) as in Eq. (2).
Definition 2. Let i be a bidder and fix the bids of all
other bidders. Let wac(i) (i’s acceptance weight) be the infi-
mum of all bids that i can make such that i is accepted when
he bids. Similarly, let wsv(i) (i’s survival weight) be the in-
fimum of all bids that i can make such that i is accepted
when he bids and survives until time T (the end). Clearly,
wac(i) ≤ wsv(i). Let W sv =Pi∈S wsv(i).
3 When bidder t arrives, assume At−1 = A ∪ D where D
only contains dummy bidders and there exists a matching
It of A ∪ {t} which matches t to some item it. By reassign-
ing dummy bidders, we can assume that actual bidders are
matched according to It. Then bidder t can bump at least
the dummy bidder d ∈ D that is matched to it in At−1.
Note that wsv(i) always exists since it suffices to bid (1 +
γ)maxj 6=i w(j). Also, w
ac(i) and wsv(i) are independent of
i’s actual bid, but may depend on the time i bids and on the
other bidders’ bids or arrivals (times of bidding). Note that
wac(i) can be computed by the seller as soon as a bidder
arrives whereas wsv(i) may depend on future bidders and
thus can only be computed at time T .
In summary, i is
8><
>:
rejected, if w(i) < wac(i)
bumped, if wac(i) ≤ w(i) < wsv(i)
a survivor, if wsv(i) ≤ w(i)
If i is a survivor, i’s price pi is as follows:
pi =
(
wsv(i)(1− α) if wac(i) < wsv(i).
wsv(i) if wac(i) = wsv(i).
(2)
The common case is when wac(i) < wsv(i): i gets a dis-
count amounting to the highest refund it could have other-
wise obtained: αwsv(i). The special case of wac(i) = wsv(i)
occurs when i’s acceptance is enough for its survival (in par-
ticular if i is the last bidder). When wac(i) = wsv(i), from
the bidder point’s of view, Mα(γ) posts a price of w
ac(i).
This concludes the definition of Mα(γ). We will now study
its properties.
4. INCENTIVE PROPERTIES
The following theorem summarizes our mechanism’s fa-
vorable incentive properties.
Theorem 1. The Mα(γ) mechanism is individually ratio-
nal. Bidding one’s true value (weakly) dominates any lower
bid. If honest, any survivor is (weakly) best-responding.
The proof follows from the two lemmas below.
Note that with bump payments (“money for nothing”)
we cannot hope to have a truthful mechanism since any-
one with no interest in any allocation can bid hoping to get
a bump payment. It is nevertheless possible that other types
of truthful competitive allocation mechanisms exist.
Lemma 1. Bidding less than one’s true value is domi-
nated by bidding one’s true value. A bumped bidder’s best
response may however be to bid more than its true value.
Proof. If wac(i) < wsv(i), bidder i’s highest possible
bump payment is αwsv(i). The price of (1 − α)wsv(i) has
been chosen such that i prefers winning to being paid αwsv(i)
if and only if v(i) ≥ wsv(i). That is, the best bid i can make
(i’s best-response) is to bid just below wsv(i) if v(i) < wsv(i)
and to bid its true value otherwise.
If wac(i) = wsv(i), then i can never get a bump payment
and i simply faces a take-it-or-leave-it offer of wsv(i).
Can a bidder ever incur a loss by participating? The fol-
lowing result shows that if truthful, no bidder will have a
negative utility, i.e. the mechanism is individually rational.
Lemma 2. If bidder i bids its true value v(i), then i’s
utility after participating in the mechanism is non-negative.
Proof. When surviving, i pays at most wsv(i) ≤ v(i). If
i is not accepted then i’s utility is 0. If i is accepted and
then bumped, i’s utility is −αv(i) + αv(i) = 0.
In the following two sections we show that apart from
favorable incentive properties, Mα(γ) is also competitive with
respect to revenue and efficiency.
5. EFFICIENCY OF Mα(γ)
Definition 3. For any vector w′ = (w′(1), . . . , w′(n)) of
weights, we let OPT[w′] be the weight of the optimal match-
ing (recall that the seller knows any bidder’s choice set).
We will overload the expression and let OPT[w′] also de-
note the optimal matching (as opposed to its weight), when
there is no confusion. If B is a set of bidders, we will
denote w′(B) =
P
b∈B w
′(b). Unless specified otherwise,
w = (w(1), . . . , w(n)) denotes the input bids and v denotes
the true values. We will denote by OPT = OPT[w].
From an algorithmic perspective, our mechanism is a 1 +
γ approximation to the optimum assignment (Lemma 4).
However, if incentives are not aligned then bidders may want
to significantly alter the input to the algorithm (their bids).
The allocation may then be a poor choice considering bid-
ders’ true values. We show that this is not the case, in
Theorem 2, our main result regarding Mα(γ)’s efficiency: the
assignment output by our mechanism is a constant factor
(depending on α and γ) approximation to the offline opti-
mum on bidders’ true values if bids are ”reasonable”.
Theorem 2. Let w be a set of bids such that each bidder
bids at least its true value, that is w(i) ≥ v(i) ∀ i, and the
sum of all bidders’ utilities is non-negative. When run on
w, Mα(γ)’s efficiency with respect to the true values v is:
X
i∈S(w)
v(i) ≥
1− α− α
γ
(2− α− α
γ
)(1 + γ)
·OPT[v].
Note that if all bidders are truthful then the right-hand side
constant can be increased to 1
1+γ
(see Lemma 4 below).
Recall the impossibility of making truthfulness a domi-
nant strategy due to the use of bump payments. Theorem 2’s
assumption allows for some bidders to have negative utility
and therefore fail to best-respond (Lemma 2 shows that sim-
ply by being truthful, a bidder’s utility is at least 0) as long
as overall, gains outweigh losses in utility. The assumption
fails when, for example, bidders with value 0 for an alloca-
tion (the“speculators” of Section 7) grossly overestimate the
actual bids and end up being allocated and having to pay
due to bidding too high. In such a scenario, the true value of
the allocation may be very small, possibly 0. We refer the
reader to Section 7 for a more detailed discussion on how
speculators affect incentives.
We now proceed to proving Theorem 2, establishing a few
other important results along the way. The following bid
vector will prove useful:
w˜S(i) =
(
wsv(i), if i ∈ S
w(i)/(1 + γ), if i /∈ S .
Note that if i /∈ S then wsv(i) > w(i) > w(i)/(1 + γ).
Lemma 3 is used for both efficiency and revenue claims.
Its proof is more involved and we defer it to the Appendix.
Lemma 3. Any survivor s ∈ S(w) is also in OPT[w˜S ].
The following result provides an upper bound on the sum
of bumped bidders’ bids and shows that S is a 1+γ approx-
imation to the optimal offline matching given the same set
of bids. Recall that R is the set of bumped bidders.
Lemma 4. We have w(R) ≤ W sv/γ ≤ w(S)/γ. Also,
OPT ≤ (1 + γ)w(S).
Proof. For each s ∈ S, let d1, . . . , dJ = s be a chain such
that: dj+1 bumps dj , ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ J−1. To simplify notation,
assume d1 = 1, . . . , dJ−1 = J − 1. We will show that
J−1X
j=1
w(j) ≤ wsv(s)/γ
The claim will follow since the set of bidders is the disjoint
union of survivors’ chains.
Since s bumped J−1, we have wJ−1 ≤ wsv(s)1+γ . Since j+1
bumps j, ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ J − 2, wj ≤ wj+11+γ . Thus by induction,
wj ≤ wsv(s)(1 + γ)j−J , ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ J − 1. We get
J−1X
j=1
wj ≤ wsv(s)
J−1X
j=1
(1 + γ)j−J ≤ wsv(s)/γ
We have w(S) ≥ w˜S(S) = OPT[w˜S ] ≥ OPT[w]/(1 +
γ). Each inequality is implied by the fact that no bidder’s
contribution decreases when going from the left hand side
to the right hand side. The equality follows from Lemma 3:
S is an optimal basis for w˜S , i.e. w˜S(S) = OPT[w˜S].
An analogous lemma can be found in [9]. Our constants
are tighter because in our model, a bidder’s value for any
slot is the same, and all edges incident to a bidder arrive
simultaneously. These bounds are almost tight:
Example 1. Consider k + 2 truthful bidders competing
on one item; bidder i is the i-th to arrive and has value
(1 + γ)i−1 unless i = k + 2, whose value is (1 + γ)k+1 − ε.
Bidder i+ 1 bumps i, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Only the k + 1-st bidder
survives. The bumped bidders have total weight
Pk−1
i=0 (1 +
γ)i = ((1 + γ)k − 1)/γ. OPT is (1 + γ)k+1 − ε.
Proof of Theorem 2. By assumption, bidders’ total util-
ity is non-negative:X
s∈S
(v(s)− (1− α)wsv(s)) +
X
r∈R
αw(r) ≥ 0
We have from Lemma 4 that
P
r∈Rw(r) ≤
P
s∈S w
sv(s)/γ.
We prove thatX
s∈S
(v(s) + wsv(s)) ≥ OPT[v]/(1 + γ).
The theorem then follows by algebraic manipulation.
Let w′(s) := max(v(s), wsv(s))∀ s ∈ S. Clearly, w(s) ≥
w′(s)∀ s ∈ S, otherwise they would not have survived. Also,
v(s) + wsv(s) ≥ w′(s) ∀ s ∈ S by definition. If everyone
in S bids w′ instead of w, the outcome does not change
(they still bid above their survival thresholds). By Lemma 4,P
s∈S w
′(s) ≥ OPT[w′]/(1 + γ) and OPT[w′] ≥ OPT[v] by
definition, giving the claim.
5.1 Effective Efficiency
Efficiency is usually measured as the sum of winning bid-
ders’ values. An alternative definition which also takes into
account the losses of bumped bidders and may be more ap-
propriate when cancellations are allowed is the following:
Definition 4. Let w be a sequence of bids and A an on-
line allocation algorithm, possibly with cancellations. Let
S(A) (resp. R(A)) be the set of winners (resp. bumped bid-
ders) when A is run on w. We define the effective efficiency
of A on w as
u(w) =
P
s∈S(A)w(s)− α
P
r∈R(A)w(r)
A’s effective efficiency competitive ratio is inf
w
u(w)
OPT[w]
We present an upper bound (obtained numerically) on
the competitive ratio of any deterministic algorithm. For
α < 0.618 and a certain γα, Mα(γα) matches this upper
bound.
For a fixed α, let n ≥ 2 a positive integer and c ∈ (0, 1):
we aim for n bidders and a competitive ratio of c. Consider
one item and a sequence of bids {ak(c)}1≤k≤n on it (bidder
k bids ak) such that a1 = 1, a2 =
1
c
> 1 and
cak+1(c) = ak(c)− α
k−1X
j=1
aj(c) ∀ k ≥ 2 implying
cak+1 = (1 + c)ak − (1 + α)ak−1 ∀ k ≥ 2 (3)
We will look for a c = cn such that
an(c)− α
n−1X
j=1
aj(c) = can(c) ⇐⇒ an = (1 + α)an−1 (4)
E.g. c2 =
1
1 + α
> c3 =
1
1 + 2α
> c4 =
2
1+3α+
√
(1+5α)(1+α)
.
Unfortunately, cn does not have a nice closed form for n ≥ 4
(in addition, cn may be not be unique - the smallest cn ∈
[0, 1] is then of interest).
Theorem 3. Fix n and α. Let cn be the lowest number
(if any) in [0, 1] for which Eqs. (3) and (4) simultaneously
hold. Then no deterministic algorithm can have an effective
efficiency competitive ratio higher than cn.
Proof. On any input, the offline optimum with respect
to effective efficiency is simply the highest weight assign-
ment, and it results in bumping no bidders.
Assume that the bids that arrive are a1, . . . , ak0 for some
1 ≤ k0 ≤ n. Then at each k, the algorithm A must accept
ak, or its competitive ratio will be smaller than cn when
k = k0. This is clear for k = 1. Fix k ∈ [2, n − 1]. Let
Mk be the highest (i.e. the offline optimum) of a1, . . . , ak.
If A does not accept k then the competitive ratio on input
a1, . . . , ak will be at most
ak−1(cn)− α
Pk−2
j=1 aj(cn)
Mk(cn)
=
cnak(cn)
Mk(cn)
≤ cn
where the equality follows from Eq. (3). Now we claim that
whether or not A accepts an, its competitive ratio will be at
most cn. If an is accepted, α
Pn−1
j=1 aj has been lost due to
bumping bidders 1, . . . , n− 1; if an is rejected the effective
efficiency is an−1 − αPn−2j=1 aj . By Eqs. (3) and (4), both
quantities are a cn fraction of an, which in turn is at most
Mn, the optimal (effective) efficiency.
Figure 1 strongly suggests that the competitive ratio of
any algorithm cannot be higher than 2α+1−2α0.5(α+1)0.5,
shown as squares in the figure. Note that for this c the
characteristic equation of Eq. (3) has a double root.
The triangles plot the minimum c found for the corre-
sponding α for different values of n (we used Fibonacci val-
ues up to rank 12, i.e. largest n was 144). The c values were
found via binary search. It was true in general, although not
always, that the higher n, the lower cn. We suspect that one
can always find an increasing sequence of integers {ni}i≥1
such that a solution cni to Eqs. (3) and (4) converges from
above to 2α+ 1− 2α0.5(α+ 1)0.5 as i→∞.
Lemma 4 implies that for our algorithm
u = w(S)− αw(R) ≥ w(S)− αw(S)/γ ≥ OPT
1 + γ
„
1− α
γ
«
.
Let u(γ) = 1
1+γ
“
1− α
γ
”
. Subject to the constraint α ≤
γ
γ+1
, u(γ) is maximized for γ0 = max{α +
√
α2 + α, α
1−α
}.
u(γ0) is displayed in Fig. 1 by circles. The value 0.618 (the
golden ratio) is where α
1−α
becomes higher than α+
√
α2 + α.
If α < 0.618, u(γ0) = 2α+1−2α0.5(α+1)0.5, which matches
the numerical upper bound. Recall that this is just a worst-
case lower bound on the effective efficiency, but likewise, so
are the upper bounds. The top curve plots c3 = 1/(1 + 2α).
Recall that when α = 0 all bidders can be tentatively
accepted (by letting γ = 0) since they incur no loss and do
not have to be refunded. Then, the optimal matching can
be found via a one-shot (offline) algorithm at time T .
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Figure 1: Effective efficiency (EE) bounds as a func-
tion of α. The top curve is c3 = 1/(1+2α). The middle
curve is a numerical upper bound on any determin-
istic algorithm’s EE: it shows cn computed numeri-
cally from its recursion relations. The bottom curve
shows (a lower bound on) our algorithm’s EE for the
best γα: it matches the upper bound for α < 0.618.
Our choice of γ is constrained by α < γ/(γ + 1); if it
were not, the bounds would match for all α.
6. REVENUE OF Mα(γ)
We show that apart from favorable incentive and efficiency
properties, Mα(γ) is also competitive with respect to revenue.
As a revenue benchmark, we consider the offline VCG
mechanism because it generates the highest revenue among
truthful efficient allocation mechanisms [7]. We show that
our mechanism is competitive with respect to revenue with
VCG on bidders’ true values.
Let w′ be a sequence of bids - when defining VCG on w′
we will assume that all bids are received at once by VCG.
Let w′−i denote the set of all bids in w
′ except bidder i’s.
The VCG mechanism implements an efficient allocation and
thus the matching it outputs is optimal. If i ∈ OPT[w′] then
VCG charges bidder i its externality on the other bidders:X
k∈OPT[w′
−i
]
w′(k) −
X
j 6=i,j∈OPT[w′]
w′(j) (5)
We will use the following known (see e.g. [3], Fact 3.2)
combinatorial property of our setting: ∀ i 6= x, if x ∈ OPT[w′]
then x ∈ OPT[w′−i].
Lemma 5. A winning bidder’s VCG payment is a losing
bid. Also, the VCG revenue can only increase if some bids
in w′ are increased.
On bids w′ we denote the VCG revenue by REVvcg[w
′] and
the net revenue of Mα(γ) (payments from survivors minus
bump payments) by REVγ,α[w
′].
Theorem 4. Assume w(i) ≥ v(i) ∀ i, i.e. no one bids
below their true value, since that would be dominated. Then
REVγ,α[w] ≥ 1− α− α/γ
1 + γ
REVvcg [w]
This theorem shows the tradeoff between γ, the improve-
ment factor required for bumping an accepted bidder and α,
the fraction returned as the bump payment. For instance,
for α = 0.25 (refund of 1/4th the bid), if we choose γ = 1
then the constant in Theorem 4 becomes 0.25, i.e. our mech-
anism obtains at least a quarter of the VCG revenue.
We will now prove Theorem 4.
Lemma 4 implies that payments received by Mα(γ) are at
least W sv(1− α) (since only survivors pay) and that bump
payments sum to at most W sv
α
γ
. It will suffice to show that
W sv ≥ REVvcg [w]/(1 + γ).
Let u(i) =
(
max(wsv(i), w(i)/(1 + γ)), if i ∈ S
w(i)
1+γ
, if i /∈ S .
Lemma 3 states that ∀ s ∈ S, s ∈ OPT[w˜S]. Since on w˜S
VCG payments cannot be higher than its efficiency, W sv ≥
REVvcg [w˜S]. Also, Lemma 5 implies
REVvcg [w˜S ] = REVvcg [u] ≥ REVvcg[w]/(1 + γ),
since when going from w˜S to u only VCG winners may in-
crease their bid, and for all i, u(i) ≥ w(i)/(1 + γ).
Note that unlike the analogous efficiency result (Theo-
rem 2), this result makes no assumption on bidders’ utilities.
7. SPECULATORS
Since money is given away, speculators, that is, bidders
without interest in any item are likely to enter the mecha-
nism looking for bump payments. For a speculator i, utility
is also given by Eq. (1), but with v(i) = 0. Speculators may
bid (under false identities) more than once or collude. Their
bids can effectively induce reserve prices, since actual bid-
ders will have to bid a 1+ γ factor higher than a competing
speculator. If speculators bid judiciously on high-demand
items, they can garner payment from the auctioneer, who
gets even more revenue via larger prices for high-value bid-
ders. So, it is clear that speculators are impactful.
In this section we address the question of how speculators
affect the mechanism. In Section 7.1, we show two positive
results
• We show that the Mα(γ) algorithm has good overall ef-
ficiency, as long as the speculators have positive overall
surplus and the survivors are best-responding.
• We prove a bound on the overall revenue that specu-
lators can obtain.
In Section 7.2 we give a more detailed discussion of specu-
lator strategy. Along the way, we show that many natural
simplifying assumptions regarding speculators’ or bidders’
strategies are unfortunately false. Specifically, we show that:
• the profits available for speculators may depend on the
arrival order of actual bidders (Example 2);
• there may be no pure Nash equilibrium for actual bid-
ders or speculators (Example 2);
• speculators may prefer to induce a suboptimal perfect
matching of actual bidders (Example 3);
• a colluding set of speculators may be able to get higher
bump payments if some of them survive (Example 4).
7.1 Impact on Efficiency and Revenue
The following result gives a competitive ratio of our al-
gorithm’s efficiency with respect to the optimum efficiency
given bidders’ true values. It only requires that total specu-
lator utility is non-negative: this is particularly applicable if
speculators are coordinated and can make monetary trans-
fers between them.
Proposition 1. Let w be a set of bids such that actual
survivors are best-responding and total speculator surplus,
i.e. the sum of speculators’ payments minus the sum of spec-
ulators’ prices, is non-negative. Then the Mα(γ) algorithm
with true values v has efficiency
X
i actual,i∈S
v(i) ≥
1− α− α
γ
(1− α)(1 + γ) ·OPT[v]
The proof is mostly algebraic and deferred to the Appendix.
This result is a strengthening of Theorem 2: Prop. 1’s con-
stant is larger and its preconditions are less general. Note
that Prop. 1 requires that actual survivors are best-responding;
a speculator’s best response cannot induce it to survive.
Next we prove an upper bound on speculators’ profit:
Proposition 2. Speculators’ total profit is at most αOPT/γ.
Proof. Let Σ be the sum of survival weights for spec-
ulators that have survived. Denote speculators’ profit by
Π ≤ −(1−α)Σ+ αw(R), where R are the participants who
obtain bump payments (some may be true bidders).
By Lemma 4, w(R) ≤ (Σ + A)/γ, where A is the total
weight of survivors that are actual bidders. We get
Π ≤ −(1− α− α
γ
)Σ +
α
γ
A
The claim follows since (1−α− α
γ
)Σ ≥ 0 and A ≤ OPT.
7.2 Speculator Strategies
At first glance, it would seem that it is in the speculators’
best interest to induce an assignment of actual bidders of
weight as high as possible in the survivor set, since then
overall bump payments would be maximized. This is true
in some cases but not always (Example 3). The reason for
such a distinction is that the order of bidders arriving also
influences the maximum refunds attainable by speculators
as shown below.
Example 2. Consider two bidders, one bidding 1, the
other C > 1, on two items and assume that speculators can-
not collude. If C arrives first, no speculator can have higher
revenue if bumped than when bidding 1/(1+γ) on both items:
this is actually a Nash equilibrium (NE) for them. If 1 how-
ever arrives first, then speculators could participate with two
identities bidding 1/(1 + γ) and C/(1 + γ) on both items,
both being bumped. One can show via a case analysis that
there is no pure strategy NE for speculators.
This example also shows that there may not be a pure strat-
egy NE when only actual bidders participate: if two bidders
with low values arrive, followed by the 1 bidder and after
that the C bidder, then the two low value bidders are essen-
tially speculators and the argument in the example applies.
Observe that a speculator who is bumped with a bid of
x could have obtained more bump payment by entering an
earlier bid of at most x/(1 + γ); likewise, he could have
obtained yet more by bidding earlier x/(1 + γ)2; and so on.
This is formalized as follows.
Definition 5. Let x > 0. We say that the speculator σ
is an x-geometric speculator with choice set N(i) if σ places
bids as follows on choice set N(i). Let ε be the minimum
strictly positive bid that can be made and
l = 1+
—
log(x/ε)
log(1 + γ)

i.e. l ∈ Z & x
(1 + γ)l
≥ ε > x
(1 + γ)l+1
Then σ participates with l + 1 different identities, placing
consecutive bids of x
(1+γ)l
, x
(1+γ)l−1
, . . . , x
(1+γ)
, x on N(i).
If speculators have full information on bidders’ values and
bidders in OPT arrive in increasing order of their values, the
outcome has many desirable properties:
Lemma 6. Fix a set of actual bids such that OPT[v] bids
arrive in increasing order. Suppose that speculators collude
and want to maximize their joint revenue. Then optimal
speculator bidding has the following consequences:
• no speculator survives, no actual bidder is bumped; all
OPT bidders and only them are accepted.
• speculators can achieve the highest payoff possible as
given by Lemma 2.
• truthful bidding is a NE for all actual bidders.
This is a further strengthening of Theorem 2. Optimal spec-
ulator bidding in this case is as follows. For each bidder
i ∈ OPT with choice set N(i) there will be one w(i)/(1+γ)-
geometric speculator σi with the same choice set. The proof
is deferred to the full version.
This result has an appealing interpretation. If very well
informed, speculators can overcome the efficiency loss due
to late bidders not being able to improve by a 1 + γ factor
over their earlier competitors.
In general however, speculators may prefer to induce a
suboptimal perfect matching:
Example 3. Consider two items {i1, i2} and three bid-
ders b1, b2, b3 arriving in this order; bidder k is interested
in item ik, k = 1, 2, while bidder 3 is interested in any of i1
or i2. Note that any matching that does not match all three
bidders is valid. Assume that w(b1) < w(b3) < (1 + γ)w(b1)
and w(b2) > 2w(b3). The following analysis shows that spec-
ulators prefer the suboptimal set of actual bidders b1 and b2
to the optimal one with b2 and b3.
• If both b2 and b3 survive, then speculators’ profit is at
most 2w(b3)/γ: the speculator bumped by b2 must have
a lower weight than the one bumped by b3, which is at
most w(b3)/(1+γ). Even if speculators are geometric,
speculator profit can only go as high as 2w(b3)/γ.
• If however b1 and b2 are alive when b3 arrives, b3 can-
not bump b1. By simply having one geometric w(b2)/(1+
γ)-speculator which is bumped by b2, speculator profit
is w(b2)/γ > 2w(b3)/γ.
The following example shows that speculators may be able
to make more money if they “sacrifice”, i.e. some of them
intentionally survive so that others obtain high refunds:
Example 4. Let there be k items, k − 1 actual bidders
bidding C > 1 all arriving before an actual bidder bidding
1; all k bidders bid on all the items. If speculators coordi-
nate and participate with k identities as C/(1+γ)-geometric
speculators on all the items then total speculator payoff is
(k − 1)αC/γ − (1− α)C/γ = (kα− 1)C/γ
since k−1 will be bumped, but one will survive. If no specu-
lator survives, the most money speculators can make is k/γ,
by participating as k 1/(1 + γ)-geometric speculators. For
any α > 1/k, for a large enough C, speculators’ profit is
higher when one of them is sacrificed.
8. OTHER GAME-THEORETIC CLAIMS
We will now show that several appealing statements re-
garding incentives in our algorithm are false.
The algorithm may be more appealing for incentive pur-
poses if we paid a bumped bidder αwsv(i) instead of αw(i)
as bump payment. The following example shows why this
may result in a deficit:
Example 5. Fix α and consider an early bidder e bidding
1 and a late bidder ℓ bidding L on one item where L >
(1 + γ)2/α. Bidder ℓ survives and pays (1 + γ). If we were
to refund e an α fraction of wsv(e), e would get αL/(1+ γ).
The choice of L ensures that e is paid more than ℓ pays, i.e.
the mechanism runs a deficit.
We assumed throughout that as soon as a bidder arrives,
its choice set is known. If however that is private informa-
tion as well, incentives become weaker: in Example 6, no
bid by B∗ on its true item i2 is a best-response if bidding
on different item(s) instead is allowed. This example also
suggests why a naive generalization of Mα(γ) to the setting
where bidders have a different value for each of several items
would not be able to incentivize bidders to bid at least their
true value for each item.
Example 6. Consider two items i1, i2 and the following
set of three bidders (arriving in this order): B−3/2with value
(1 + γ)−3/2 for any of i1, i2 (only demanding one of them),
B∗ who has value x < α(1 + γ)−3/2 for item i2 and B
1
bidding 1 on item i1. Assume B
−3/2and B1 bid truthfully.
We will show that, whenever B∗ bids on {i1, i2}, it can do
strictly better by bidding on i1 only.
We claim that if B∗ bids on {i1, i2} then its utility is at
most α(1+γ)−3/2. This is clear if it survives. If it is bumped
by B1, then its bid cannot be higher than (1+γ)−3/2 (B−3/2’s
bid), since B1 can replace any of B−3/2 and B∗. But then
B∗’s compensation is at most α(1+γ)−3/2. Let 0 < ε < 1/2.
By bidding (1 + γ)−1−ε on i1 only and being bumped by B
1,
B∗ can get utility α(1 + γ)−1−ε > α(1 + γ)−3/2.
We have however the following conjecture: if a bidder
prefers surviving to being refunded, they are better off bid-
ding on their true choice set.
If bidders myopically and simultaneously best-respond then
these dynamics may lead to bid vectors where the sum of
their utilities is negative:
Example 7. Let there be n items and 2n bidders (in-
terested in any item) arriving in increasing order of their
values: bidders B1, . . . , Bn have value x < min{1, 5(1 −
α)}/(1 + γ), bidders Bn+1, . . . , B2n−1 have value 1 and bid-
der B2n has value 5. Assume they all bid truthfully initially.
Bidders n+1, . . . , 2n are best-responding by Lemma 1 and
they will not change their bids. Each bidder Bi’s, i ∈ [1, n],
myopic best-response is to bid 5/(1 + γ). Only one of them
will be bumped by B2n and the others will survive: the sum
of their utilities is at most x − (n − 1) · 5(1− α)/(1 + γ) <
−(n − 2) · 5(1 − α)/(1 + γ). No bidder between n + 1 and
2n− 1 will be accepted. Since B2n’s utility is at most 5, for
large n the sum of all 2n bidders’ utilities will be negative.
This example does not preclude good performance for other
dynamics.
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Advertisers seek a mechanism to reserve ad slots in ad-
vance, while the publishers present a large inventory of ad
slots with varying characteristics and seek automatic, online
methods for pricing and allocation of reservations. In this
paper, we present a simple model for auctioning such ad slots
in advance, which allows canceling allocations at the cost of
a bump payment. We present an efficiently implementable
online mechanism to derive prices and bump payments that
has many desirable properties of incentives, revenue and ef-
ficiency. These properties hold even though we may have
speculators who are in the game for earning bump payments
only. Our results make no assumptions about order of ar-
rival of bids or the value distribution of bidders.
Our work leaves open several technical and modeling di-
rections to study in the future. From a technical point of
view, the main questions are about designing mechanisms
with improved revenue and efficiency, perhaps under ad-
ditional assumptions about value distributions and bid ar-
rivals. Also, mechanisms that limit further the role of spec-
ulators will be of interest. In addition, there are other mod-
els that may be applicable as well. Interesting directions
for future research include allowing bidders to pay more for
higher γ (making it harder for future bidders to displace this
bidder) or higher α (being refunded more in case of being
bumped). Other mechanisms may allow α to be a function
of time between the acceptance and bumping. Accepted ad-
vertisers may be allowed to withdraw their bid at any time.
There may be a secondary market where bidders may buy in-
surance against cancellations. Finally, advertisers may want
a bundle of slots, say many impressions at multiple websites
simultaneously, which will result in combinatorial extension
of the auctions we study here. We believe that there is a
rich collection of such mechanism design and analysis issues
of interest which will need to inform any online system for
advanced ad slotting with cancellations.
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APPENDIX
A.1 Proof of Prop. 1
Assume that actual survivors bid honestly: w(i) = v(i) ∀ i;
at the end of the proof we will eliminate this assumption.
Let w′(i) =
(
wsv(i), if i ∈ S and i is a speculator
w(i), otherwise
.
As wsv(i) can only be (1+ γ)w(k) if i bumps k or w(i′) if
i′ is bumped instead of i, the set of survivors will still be S
if the mechanism is run on w′ instead of w. We have
w′(S) =
P
i∈S w
′(i) ≥ OPT[w
′]
1 + γ
≥ OPT[v]
1 + γ
(6)
The first inequality follows from Lemma 4. Each actual
bidder i bids at least its true value: w′(i) ≥ v(i) and there
is the additional competition of speculators; this fact yields
the second inequality. Also,
γw(R) ≤W sv ≤
X
i actual
i∈S
w(i) +
X
i speculator
i∈S
wsv(i) = w′(S)
Again, the first inequality follows from Lemma 4. By as-
sumption, speculator payments (a (1 − α) fraction of their
survival weights) cannot be higher than speculator refunds:
(1− α)
X
i spec.
i∈S
wsv(i) ≤
X
i spec.
i∈R
αw(i) ≤
X
i∈R
αw(i) = αw(R)
By combining the last two relationships, we get
(1− α)
X
i spec.,i∈S
wsv(i) ≤ α
γ
w′(S)
Adding (1− α)Pi actual,i∈S w(i) to both sides we get
(1− α)w′(S) ≤ α
γ
w′(S) + (1− α)
X
i actual,i∈S
w(i) i.e.
1− α− α
γ
1− α w
′(S) ≤
X
i actual,i∈S
w(i) =
X
i actual,i∈S
v(i)
The last equality follows since actual survivors are bidding
truthfully. This last inequality, together with Eq. (6) imply
the proposition’s claim.
Lemma 1 shows that bidding truthfully is a (weak) best-
response for survivors. Let i be an actual survivor. Any
bid above its true value is also a best-response for i. In the
claim, as we increase i’s bid, the right-hand side quantity
increases (if at all) at a constant rate which is less than 1,
the left-hand side quantity’s increase rate.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
We will denote by wsv≤t(b) the minimum bid bidder b must
make in order to survive up to and including time t. Then
wac(b) = wsv≤b(b) and w
sv(b) = wsv≤T (b). It is clear that
wsv≤t(b) ≤ wsv≤t+1(b).
Definition 6. Let B be a set of bidders. We say that B
is tight for a bidder i at time t if all bidders in B are alive at
t, B can be matched but B∪{i} cannot be matched. We say
that B w˜S-dominates a bidder i at time t in the algorithm
if B is tight for i at t and ∀ b ∈ B, wsv≤t(b) ≥ w(i)/(1 + γ).
Lemma 7. Xt is tight for t at t.
Proof. Xt can be matched since Xt ⊆ At−1.
Suppose for a contradiction that Xt∪{t} can be matched.
Then Xt 6= At−1 since At−1 is a perfect matching by as-
sumption. Therefore there exists X ⊂ At−1 \ Xt, |X| =
|At−1| − |Xt| − 1 such that Xt ∪ {t} ∪ X can be matched.
There exists exactly one bidder {y} = At−1 \ (Xt ∪X) and
we have that Xt ∪ {t} ∪ X = At−1 ∪ {t} \ {y} is a perfect
matching, implying y ∈ Xt, contradiction.
Let i∗ be the time step when i ceases to be alive (i.e. i if
i is not accepted or the time i is bumped if i was accepted).
We inductively construct a sequence {Bt}i∗≤t≤n as follows:
if i is not accepted, Bi = Xi; if i is bumped by i
∗ then
Bi∗ = Xi∗ ∪ {i∗} \ {i}. At time t ≥ i∗ + 1,
• if no bidder in Bt−1 is bumped, then we let Bt = Bt−1.
• if t bumps some b ∈ Bt−1 then we let Bt = (Bt−1 ∪
Xt ∪ {t}) \ {b}
We will prove inductively on t that
Lemma 8. Bt w˜S-dominates i at time t.
Proof of Lemma 8. Note that by definition, all bidders
in Bt are alive at t.
Base case t = i∗:
If i is not accepted (i∗ = i), i cannot bump any bidder in
Xi: therefore ∀ b ∈ Xi, wsv≤i(b) ≥ w(i)/(1 + γ). Xi is tight
for i at i by Lemma 7.
If i is bumped, then w(i) ≤ wsv≤i∗(r), ∀ r ∈ Xi∗ . Bi∗ =
Xi∗ ∪ {i∗} \ {i} can be matched since they are all alive at
i∗. Xi∗ ∪ {i∗} cannot be matched since otherwise i∗ would
not need to bump i ∈ Xi∗ .
Inductive step: Assume that Bt−1 w˜S-dominates i at t−1.
If at time t, no bidder in Bt−1 is bumped, then the claim
obviously holds by the induction hypothesis. Otherwise, let
b ∈ Bt−1 be the bidder that is bumped by t.
Clearly, (Bt−1 ∪Xt ∪{t})\{b} can be matched since they
are alive at t. Suppose for a contradiction that Bt ∪ {i} =
(Bt−1 ∪Xt ∪ {t})∪ {i} \ {b} could be matched. i /∈ Bt since
i is no longer alive. Bt−1 ∪ Xt can be matched since they
are all alive at t− 1. As |Bt−1 ∪Xt| = |Bt ∪ {i}| − 1, either
Bt−1 ∪ Xt ∪ {i} or Bt−1 ∪ Xt ∪ {t} can be matched. The
first case is not possible since a subset, Bt−1 ∪ {i}, cannot
be matched (by the induction hypothesis); the second case
is not possible since Xt∪{t} cannot be matched (Lemma 7).
We have reached a contradiction, so Bt must be tight for i.
By the induction hypothesis, ∀ b′ ∈ Bt−1, wsv(b′)≤t−1 ≥
w(i)/(1 + γ). As noted before, survival thresholds can only
increase from t− 1 to t and w(t) ≥ (1 + γ)w(b).
We are ready for
Proof of Lemma 3. Let V be the OPT[w˜S ] assignment
(where ties are broken in favor of bidders in S). Suppose for
a contradiction that there exists a non-survivor i ∈ V . By
Lemma 8 for time n, i is dominated by a set Bn ⊆ S at time
n. Since i /∈ S, but Bn ⊆ S, in w˜S any bidder in Bn has a
higher weight than i.
Since V is a perfect matching and Bn can be matched
there must exist V ′ ⊂ V \ Bn, |V ′| = |V | − |Bn| (V ′ = ∅
if Bn is a perfect matching) such that Bn ∪ V ′ is a (per-
fect) matching. We know that Bn ∪ {i} cannot be matched,
therefore i /∈ V ′. However, i ∈ V therefore i ∈ V \ V ′.
V \{i} can be matched and has size |V |−1. Therefore there
∃b ∈ Bn ∪ V ′, b /∈ V \ {i} such that V ∪ {b} \ {i} can be
matched. That implies b ∈ Bn ⊆ S, i.e. w˜S(b) ≥ w˜S(i).
But then V ∪{b}\{i} is a perfect matching of higher weight
than V , contradiction.
That is, V \ S = ∅, i.e. V = S since both are perfect
matchings.
